



GlobalConfusion: TrustZone Trusted Application 0-Days by Design


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HexHive

EPFL

Trusted Applications on Mobile Devices



USENIX SEC'24

Spill the TeA: An Empirical Study of Trusted Application Rollback Prevention on Android Smartphones


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Abstract

The number and complexity of Trusted Applications (TAs), applications running in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) deployed on mobile devices has exploded. A vulnerability in a *single* TA impacts the security of the entire device

TEEs on Android devices leverage the ARM TrustZone architectural extension. TrustZone creates an isolated execution context separated from the commonly known Android software stack. This separated context provides integrity and confidentiality guarantees for its components (TEE OS and

TEE Fragmentation and the GlobalPlatform API





GlobalPlatform Technology
TEE Internal Core API Specification
Version 1.3.1

Public Release

July 2021

Document Reference: GPD_SPE_010

```
TEE_Result TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint(void *sessCtx, uint32_t cmdId,  
                                     uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4])  
{
```

Stores session state

OPTIONAL

Chooses TA cmd handler

Determines types of params

Four TEE_Param parameters

```
typedef union {  
    struct {  
        void *buffer;  
        uint32_t size;  
    } memref;  
    struct {  
        uint32_t a;  
        uint32_t b;  
    } value;  
} TEE_Param;
```




A whimsical scene featuring a brown teapot with large, expressive eyes and a magnifying glass over its mouth. The teapot is positioned next to a black microscope. A monarch butterfly is perched on the microscope's eyepiece. On the wooden table in front of them are several colorful insects, including ladybugs, beetles, and ants. A pink mug and a green mug are also on the table. The background shows a cozy room with a window, a lamp, and a bookshelf.

Prevalence Study


Dataset




Android phone vendors




> 65% market share



545 firmware images



54 devices
5 different TEEs




2016 - 2024




~14,500 proprietary
TEEs

GPCheck

- Ghidra-based
- Post-production vetting
- Open-Source



Results




~6,900 TAs are GP-compliant (~131 unique TAs)


850 vulnerable TAs (33 unique vulnerable TAs)



9 publicly known



10 silently patched




14 0-days

CVE-2023-32835, CVE-2023-32834, CVE-2023-32848, CVE-2024-20078, ...

> \$ 12k bug bounty

Timeline



Mitigation



- Change fail-open to fail-close design
 - Mandatory type check
 - Fail-safe abort without proper check
- Sent proposal to GP; Draft for API update in progress
- No changes to external API (backwards compatible)





- Open-source and based on OPTEE



GlobalConfusion

Modern TZ-based TEEs on Android Mobile Devices



4



Paper



Code



```

TEE_Result TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint(void *sessCtx, uint32_t cmdId,
                                     uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4])
{
    uint32_t exp_paramTypes = TEE_PARAM_TYPES(
        TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT,
        TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT,
        TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE,
        TEE_PARAM_TYPE_NONE);

    if (paramTypes != exp_paramTypes)
        return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;

    size_t in_buf_sz = params[0].memref.size;
    char *in_buf = params[0].memref.buffer;
    size_t out_buf_sz = params[1].memref.size;
    char *out_buf = params[1].memref.buffer;

    if (in_buf_sz > out_buf_sz)
        return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;

    TEE_MemMove(out_buf, in_buf, in_buf_sz);

    return TEE_SUCCESS;
}

```

7

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